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In 2008, the Organisation for Eco-nomic Cooperation and Develop-ment (OECD) published the lat-
est in its regular series of  audits of  the 
state of  the environment, taking a global 
perspective and looking out to 2030. 
Noting that progress had been made 
on, for example, pollution from indus-
trial sources (in OECD member states at 
least) and emissions of  ozone-depleting 
substances, OECD nevertheless flashed 
a ‘red-light’ warning on several environ-
mental issues, including climate change, 
biodiversity loss and water scarcity. In 
many ways its findings are reminiscent 
of  earlier reports, such as the World 
Bank’s well known assessment of  the 
relationship between economic devel-
opment and environmental degrada-
tion published nearly twenty years ago 
in which the Bank observed that while 
some environmental problems such as 
access to adequate sanitation appeared 
to improve monotonically with eco-
nomic development, and others such as 
urban air quality appeared to improve 
only after a certain level of  economic 
development had been attained, still 
others such as greenhouse gas emissions 
worsened monotonically with rising 
per capita incomes. Thus while some 
environmental problems seemed to be 
largely a symptom of  poverty, there was 
little prospect that the world could grow 
out of  this third category of  problems, 
or at least not without an unprecedented 
societal response.
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Both reports observe that what we 
might call 21st century environmental 
problems – namely those such as cli-
mate change and biodiversity loss that 
show no signs of  being ‘decoupled’ from 
economic development – are of  a par-
ticularly intractable nature. What marks 
them out is, roughly speaking, intercon-
nectedness – they are complex and usu-
ally global in nature, and their impacts 
may only become apparent over long 
timeframes. Climate change is a clear 
example. A ‘carbon footprint’ is em-
bodied in almost all of  the goods and 
services transacted in the modern econ-
omy, thanks in large part to the burning 
of  fossil fuels for energy. Once emitted, 
greenhouse gases mix in the atmosphere 
and, through a highly complex and un-
certain process, eventually cause chang-
es to climate that are distant in time and 
(partly) in space from the emitter. 
To solve the problem by mitigation 
(i.e. reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions), it would further appear from the 
evidence that a broad portfolio of  mea-
sures is needed, as the sheer magnitude 
The causes of climate change are com-
plex, and to be effective, the policy re-
sponse will need to be equally complex. 
We must go beyond the mainstream 
economic thinking that has been part 
of the problem. A richer, interdisciplin-
ary, real-world approach is called for.   
of  emissions reductions that are consid-
ered necessary ultimately overwhelms 
the economies of  scale associated with 
any one currently practicable measure. 
That is, there does not appear to be a ‘sil-
ver bullet’, and action will be required 
on many fronts, including to deploy 
renewable energy technologies, carbon 
capture and storage technology, to im-
prove energy efficiency at home and in 
businesses, and to reduce deforestation.
As their respective prefixes would 
suggest, interconnectedness is a power-
ful reason why an interdisciplinary ap-
proach to the political economy of  the 
environment is essential. 
We need an interdisciplinary theory 
of  technological change, and a similarly 
interdisciplinary approach to the study 
of  human behaviour and how it influ-
ences both production and consumption 
choices. 
Foundations
Any scientific enquiry proceeds by ques-
tions and their resolution. Resolving 
environmental questions requires an un-
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derstanding of  their nature, of  their causes and, to the extent 
that they are anthropogenic, of  how to change human behav-
iour. The argument for looking at the very long run (now with 
respect to economic, rather than geological, history) has also 
been underlined by the recent financial crisis. 
Expected utility theory is used by neoclassical economists 
to model risk and in this approach devastating events are treat-
ed in a probabilistic fashion. Calculations are more complex 
when costs and benefits occur in the future due to changes in 
the value of  money over time, but such calculations can be 
made once an appropriate discount rate has been assumed, 
provided the probability distributions upon which they are 
based are known and stable. This assumption about known 
and stable probabilities also underpins real options theory, 
which is the extension of  neoclassical analysis to irreversible 
investments.
But this general approach is not of  much relevance in a 
world of  uncertain catastrophic events; factors such as ‘deep’ 
uncertainty, the possibility of  ‘mean shifts’ in the underlying 
probability distribution, and tipping effects all undermine the 
very calculations upon which inter-temporal evaluation relies. 
In addition, people’s actual perceptions of, and attitudes to, 
risk are often at odds with those assumed by standard eco-
nomic theory, with the consequence that behaviour may be 
rather different from that predicted by conventional economic 
analysis, absent of  an all knowing self-maximizer operating 
devoid of  the social context, but facing potentially huge global 
externalities. 
Many of  the social costs caused by environmental dam-
age are the by-product of  firms’ economic activity. As firms 
are the target of  numerous policy actions designed to limit 
environmental damage, it is important to have a clear under-
standing of  firms’ behaviour in order to predict their response 
to policy. We would point to three main limitations of  the 
standard theory of  the firm: (i) the (lack of) analysis of  the 
decision making process and managerial discretion; (ii) the 
assumption of  instrumental rationality; and (iii) the determi-
nants and role of  innovation and technological change. In re-
cent years the literature on these topics has grown, providing 
greater understanding of  firms’ behaviour within a systems 
context and implications for the design and implementation 
of  environmental policy. 
The standard economic theory of  the firm rests on the as-
sumption of  instrumental rationality (that agents have a clear-
ly defined objective, for example, profit maximisation, and 
know how to achieve it) and generally focuses on price (or 
quantity) competition in a static equilibrium framework, as-
suming well-behaved cost and demand functions. Under these 
circumstances, firms’ behaviour is reduced to calculus and, 
faced with the same circumstances; all firms take the same 
decision, so that they can be represented by a single, stylised 
firm. However, the strategic decision making process is not 
considered in a meaningful way; firms are assumed to behave 
like automata and respond to price and cost signals in an 
identical fashion. There is no scope for managerial discretion, 
instead a unique equilibrium position is guaranteed/imposed 
courtesy of  a U-shaped cost curve. Well-behaved cost curves 
also allow theoretical determination of  the effect of  taxes and 
subsidies on price, output and profitability.
This approach contrasts markedly with the managerial ap-
proach, whereby firms compete using price and a range of  
other variables including product and process innovation, 
organisational strategy, investment and marketing. Within 
the managerial literature, strategy is not confined to optimis-
ing over a single choice variable but is a more complex pro-
cess that involves organising and renewing the resources of  
the firm to meet a range of  objectives that matter alongside 
profit. Moreover, the possibility of  increasing returns to scale 
makes it difficult to predict a firm’s response to market based 
policy instruments, thus complicating policy implementation. 
Increasing returns may also have the effect of  creating lock-in 
to an inefficient technology, as it becomes difficult for a new 
technology to become established unless and until demand 
reaches minimum efficient scale of  production.
In our book (Dietz, Michie and Oughton, 2011) we ex-
plore the limitations of  instrumental rationality using a game 
theoretic approach under different time horizons and show 
that alternative models of  rationality and strategic behaviour 
provide more profitable outcomes for firms and society than 
instrumental rationality. Our analysis points to a wider range 
of  policy instruments, including not only taxes and subsidies, 
but also institutional and voluntary arrangements that may be 
catalysed or that may evolve to govern the commons.
The neoclassical approach to modelling innovation, where 
it is possible to identify an optimal level of  investment in R&D 
based on instrumental rationality and optimisation, can be 
contrasted with the ‘systems of  innovation’ approach, where 
innovation is determined by the interaction of  interconnected 
institutions in the private and public sectors as part of  a pro-
cess of  interactive learning. 
The hallmark of  the systems approach is that the behaviour 
of  the system cannot be understood by analysing individual 
components in isolation. Environmental outcomes are pro-
duced by the interaction of  natural and social systems that 
require a whole-systems view of  the Earth. The whole systems 
approach is interdisciplinary, combining natural and social sci-
ences. The problem may only be resolved by society. Over the 
past two decades this research has been consolidated within 
the interdisciplinary field of  ecological economics. 
The literature on ecological economics is beginning to shed 
Environmental outcomes are produced 
by the interaction of natural and social 
systems that require a whole-systems 
view of the Earth.
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new light on the range of  policy options available. The tradi-
tional dichotomy between taxes and regulations is a false one 
- and an effective policy may combine both. Moreover, these 
policies may be further enhanced by the use of  governance 
structures and agreements that may evolve or be catalysed by 
government to manage common pool resources, such as the 
atmosphere or oceans.
Innovation
The ‘systems of  innovation’ approach - covering ‘national 
systems of  innovation’, ‘regional systems of  innovation’ and 
‘technological systems of  innovation’ - was originally devel-
oped by the late Chris Freeman, the heterodox economist who 
founded the Science Policy Research Unit at the University 
of  Sussex. Professor Freeman recognised that the relative suc-
cess of  some countries over others in developing and adopting 
innovation was due not simply to their greater spending on 
research and development, nor indeed to any other single fac-
tor, but was due rather to a range of  systemic features of  the 
economy, including: its finance sector – and the availability of  
long-term, patient investment capital; its education and train-
ing system – and the proportion of  scientists and engineers 
in the economy; its governmental and broader public policy 
approaches and institutions. 
The systems approach provides a superior rationale for pol-
icy intervention in the area of  environmental innovation than 
does the standard, neoclassical economic approach, for while 
the latter approach also emphasises disincentives to private 
firms to innovate new, clean technologies, seen as a market 
failure alongside the environmental externality of  pollution, 
it does not generally allow for the two market failures to inter-
act. The conclusion that tends to follow from this is, to para-
phrase, that all that is required to solve environmental prob-
lems is a price signal reflecting the social value of  pollution 
abatement, and that no special remedies are required in the 
area of  innovation policy: standard, economy-wide incentives 
will do. The systems approach, by contrast, holds that there is 
indeed an interaction between the barriers to innovation and 
the disincentive to abate pollution, so that there are likely to 
be synergies arising from regulations that specifically promote 
environmentally beneficial innovation. 
The ‘Porter hypothesis’ is that environmental regulation 
need not be a cost or burden on business, but, through changes 
in managerial decisions and corporate behaviour, can simul-
taneously lead to improved environmental outcomes and in-
creased industrial competitiveness. Again, the possibility of  
a win-win outcome from the imposition of  environmental 
regulation tends to be missed by standard economic analysis, 
which assumes firms operate at their efficiency frontier prior 
to regulatory intervention, meaning that regulation simply im-
poses costs. However, Porter and his colleagues have been able 
to point to many case-study examples, showing that, when 
forced to search for efficiency improvements, firms have been 
able to find huge opportunities. The Porter hypothesis fits well 
with the innovation systems approach, because both empha-
sise the wider social and institutional drivers of  innovation, 
which a narrow focus on the private production costs of  firms 
would miss.
The old economic theory of  technological change, em-
bodied in the so-called ‘Solow residual’, was not really much 
of  a theory at all: technological change was simply that part 
of  economic growth that could not actually be explained by 
measurable investment in capital and labour. Accordingly, the 
conceptual heirs to this theory in the field of  energy/climate 
modelling simply specified innovation of  clean technology as 
an exogenous variable (‘manna from heaven’), and tended as 
a result to conclude that deep cuts in greenhouse gas emis-
sions would be unaffordable. By contrast, recent theories in 
neoclassical economics and in other disciplines seek to model 
the process of  technological change explicitly, including the 
notion that it is ‘induced’ by changes in government policy 
and private-sector investment activity. Crucially, implementa-
tion of  these ideas in energy/climate modelling can lead to 
the conclusion that deep cuts in emissions are affordable.
Mainstream computable general equilibrium (CGE) mod-
els are limited by their inherently static nature. For instance, 
the assumption of  diminishing returns to scale, which lies at 
the core of  the equilibrium approach to economics, is violated 
in cases where learning-by-doing drives down the cost of  clean 
technologies, in the process of  deploying them at increasing 
scale. The idea of  increasing returns to scale is linked with 
the notion of  long waves of  economic growth. Long-wave 
theory has been developed as an attempt to explain the major 
technological and economic transformations of  the 19th and 
20th centuries, including the emergence of  steam power and 
computerisation. Given the structural change we face in de-
carbonising the global economy over the next half  century or 
more, long-wave theory could be similarly insightful in help-
ing design policy for the future.
The impact upon the economy of  economic policy inter-
ventions does not always work ‘at the margin’, with a rise in 
price (caused for example by a tax on carbon) leading to mar-
ginal changes in consumption and production. On the con-
trary, historically, there have been steep changes in the way 
that economies operate, with major shifts in whole technology 
and productive systems. We are not talking of  a marginal move 
towards or away from some equilibrium – were that concept 
to have any use, the equilibrium itself  would be shifting, in-
volving a dynamic disequilibrium. Looked at in terms of  such 
major shifts in trajectories and long swings in economic cycles 
and their accompanying productive systems, it was hoped by 
many that just as the Great Depression of  the 1930s gave rise 
to the New Deal, so the first global recession since the 1930s, 
namely the global economic downturn of  2009, following the 
2007-08 credit crunch, would give rise to a global ‘Green New 
Deal’, with government intervention leading to a major shift 
towards green technologies and environmentally sustainable 
production.
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At the time of  writing in September 2011, the opportunity 
appears to have been lost, with the banks returning to their 
pre-credit-crunch focus on short-term financial returns, and 
governments scaling back their spending and investments 
rather than promoting any major green technologies. Howev-
er, provided that policy globally sets clear, long-term require-
ments to achieve environmental improvements, there will be 
commercial advantage to be had by being in the lead in the 
new green technologies, which will need to be adopted and 
diffused globally. The accompanying infrastructures will most 
likely require public sector provision, so a Green New Deal 
may yet emerge in the course of  the global economy recover-
ing, within the context of  having to accommodate to increas-
ingly tough environmental standards.
Sustainable production and consumption
In the rational choice model of  human behaviour, individuals 
confront choices ranging from the everyday to the once-in-a-
lifetime by carefully computing the expected net private ben-
efits of  various courses of  action, with a view to choosing the 
alternative that is expected to maximise these benefits. This 
rational choice model is widely used, but is particularly no-
table for its central role in the economic theory of  consumer 
preferences. Yet a number of  important criticisms have over 
the years been levelled at rational choice theory.
The first well-known critique focuses on the assumption 
that individuals carefully compute their expected net private 
benefits over a complete range of  alternatives. In the face of  
limited resources, a rich tradition shows that individuals do 
not always (perhaps even usually) maximise expected utility, 
instead falling back on satisficing behaviour (i.e. selecting al-
ternatives that are simply ‘good enough’), or various rules of  
thumb. Another line of  attack has been forged by those empha-
sising the role of  emotion in guiding behaviour. The second 
critique focuses on the assumption of  individuality; that is, 
the individual as the fundamental unit of  analysis in rational 
choice theory. This may miss the point, some social psycholo-
gists have argued, because individuals’ sense of  identity is so-
cially constructed, through interactions with others. In addi-
tion, individualism may overlook the important role played by 
social structures in decision making. Frequently, these social 
structures have much longer lifetimes than individuals, and 
it is possible to find many examples of  institutions to which 
individuals belong, despite there being no obvious benefit to 
the individuals concerned. The third critique focuses on the 
assumption that individuals act in the pursuit of  their own in-
terests, instead emphasising what is rather abstractly termed 
‘other-regarding behaviour’. It is technically possible to incor-
porate such behaviour in the rational choice model, by assum-
ing that individuals obtain utility from, for example, altruism, 
but for the critics this stretches the rational choice model to the 
point of  being meaningless, tautological even.
To take these critiques seriously, an integrative theory is re-
quired, which builds on the insights from social psychology, 
sociology and other disciplines to generate a richer model 
of  consumer behaviour, including both internal and external 
drivers (i.e. to the individual), and where the internal drivers 
extend beyond the evaluation of  expected net private benefits 
to embrace factors such as emotion, habits and values. 
One interpretation of  the various critiques of  rational 
choice theory, and the integrative theory that reconciles them, 
is that the contemporary mantra of  ‘hands-off ’ governance is 
misguided. Government intervenes in the fabric of  society in 
many ways, far beyond the direct imposition of  environmental 
policies, which is the boundary of  many conventional analy-
ses. Government is partly responsible for the culture of  (over-)
consumption, and one might then conclude that it is widely 
responsible for re-orientating consumer culture. Put another 
way, the scope of  government intervention in the sustainabil-
ity debate might go far beyond piecemeal regulatory interven-
tion, to address the underlying goals of  development, and 
the expectations and motivations people imbibe from those 
goals.
These arguments are substantiated with supporting evidence by the 
various contributors to S. Dietz, J. Michie and C. Oughton (eds), 
The Political Economy of  the Environment – an interdisciplinary 
approach, Routledge, 2011.
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